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Denis Bouchard’s book is a refreshingly new take on the old problem of detailing 
the processes by which humans became linguistic creatures, a puzzle that 
researchers of varying disciplines have been attempting to solve since long before 
the inception of modern biolinguistics. It is perhaps not surprising that the book, 
divided into four parts, starts with several chapters that call to our attention the 
apparent failure to provide a definite answer to this question. Bouchard argues 
that, for a start, language cannot be explained scientifically if linguistics receives 
a treatment or a status that is different from the other sciences, a mistake that he 
finds evidenced by the scarcity of principled explanations in the literature.  
 A principled explanation is one that considers the object of study as 
dependent on logically prior elements from which it arises. Since language can be 
considered as a system that links percepts and concepts, or representations of 
sound and meaning, the principled elements of language should be those studied 
by the sciences of meaning and perception. Explaining the evolution of language, 
in sum, is determining how the systems that produced concepts and percepts 
changed in the brains of our ancestors so that their products could be linked and 
become signs. The existence of signs is, therefore, “the only special property of 
language” (p. 97).  
 Parts II and III of the book, introducing Bouchard’s own Sign Theory of 
Language (STL), invite us to consider the evolutionary implications of assuming 
that language is just a system of signs. But first, what is a sign? According to 
Saussure (1916), a sign can be defined as a relation between a representation of a 
sound pattern (a signifier, e.g. /dɔg/), and a representation of a chunk of cog-
nition (a signified, e.g. the concept of dog). Two special properties of signs are 
crucial to understanding their nature: abstraction and arbitrariness. Signs are 
abstract because they are detached from any brain-external stimuli or immediacy. 
Signs are arbitrary relations because there is nothing in any of the properties of 
their parts that justifies their linking. 
 Perhaps controversially, Bouchard argues that abstraction was the change 
in the conceptual system of our ancestors which ended up granting humans their 
unique cognitive suite. Not only language, but also complex imitative abilities, 
theory of mind, episodic memory, and object permanence could be traced back to 
Biolinguistics  «  Reviews  « 
	  
68 
the emergence of Offline Brain Systems (OBS) in the brain of our ancestors. Since 
these systems did not appear from nothing, but were a new functionality that 
occurred in preexisting mirror systems, perhaps the term is a bit misleading. It 
should not be taken, however, as anything else than the claim that some parts of 
the brain started to represent things in the absence of external stimuli, while 
inhibiting any motor actions that would follow from actual perception. This 
change is linked by the author to an increase in the number of neurons in the hu-
man cortex, which, added to a tendency towards a more globular shape of the 
cranium, led to an increase in connectivity and internal activity (pp. 115–119).  
 Of course, signs would not be possible without OBS. Abstraction is the key 
difference that separates human concepts from animal categories or percepts. By 
taking a percept (for instance, a sound pattern like /dɔg/) and abstracting it from 
the immediate environment, we are able to entertain a signifier. Since signifiers 
have the same psychological nature as signifieds (both are conceptual), linking 
them to create a sign becomes an easy step. Bouchard thinks that the relation that 
exists between signifier and signified is one of reciprocal predication. It should be 
noted that the author follows Hurford (2007) in considering predication as a trait 
with evolutionary ancient roots, present in the perceptual systems of complex 
animals. This pre-existing property is then employed to fulfill the role of sign 
formation in a similar way to how a specific color pattern is attributed to a 
leopard. 
 The second property of signs, arbitrariness, arises as a side effect of the 
completely different perceptual origins of signifiers and signifieds. Arbitrariness 
has important structural implications for language. Since the link between 
signifier and signified is generally unmotivated, the range of possible signs, in 
theory, is unbounded, and the links between their parts can change rapidly both 
across time and individuals. This would lead to a chaotic, random system, if it 
were not for the fact that language is a biological function that arises under the 
physical and cognitive constraints of the human mind. In chapter 6, Bouchard 
introduces the notion of epigenetic self-organizing constraints, borrowed from 
biology (Jacob 1982, Erwin 2003), to account for the language-external properties 
of both parts of the sign.  
 Regarding external constraints on signifiers, we find that vocalizations and 
gestures are naturally perceived as discrete segments, and that the phonemic 
repertoire is organized towards a balance between ease of articulation and ease of 
perception. As a consequence of this balance, the phonemic repertoire tends to 
cluster into a small set of percepts that maximizes contrast between its elements. 
Given that the set of phonemes ends up being very small, and that the set of 
possible meanings is much larger, phonemes are not enough to match all of the 
latter, so they start to combine with each other (together with other biologically 
common vocal resources like stress, length, and intonation), building words. This 
process is made possible by OBS, which can reinterpret a chain of distinctive 
phonemes as a discrete unit, granting it the status of a new sign. Similar to 
phonemes, words are limited in complexity by their frequency of use (cf. Zipf 
1949/1965) and, of course, human memory. This proposal that I just summarized 
is also a justification for the existence of signifiers. We could perfectly well imag-
ine an internal language that lacks the phonological component but is still able to 
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discretely combine signifieds. However, Bouchard argues that this hypothetical 
language would “lack the triggering elements for combinatorial processes to 
emerge” (p. 160).  
 Signifieds are also affected by language-external constraints. The author, 
again following Hurford (2007), points at perception being organized around 
objects and properties, a distinction manifested in language by the subject-
predicate and head-dependent relations. Similar to what happened in the case of 
signifiers, although OBS can take any perceptual episode and encode it as a 
signified, the meanings that usually cluster into signs are those that are activated 
more frequently and within a broader array of contexts. Since our perception is 
based on categories, it is expected that the words of a language can be employed 
to refer to sortals, abstract qualities, etc., and not exclusively to specific 
perceptual events. 
 At the end of Part III (pp. 169–179), the author introduces an original view 
of syntax that is also based on the sign. More specifically, syntax is defined as a 
small set of signs (C-signs) that are in charge of relating words to produce 
complex meanings. The signifier of a C-sign can be either part of a paradigm that 
is stored in memory (such as in case marking), or a syntagmatic relation of ele-
ments (such as the subject–verb–object relation). Its signified, on the other hand, 
is based on the most distinctive feature of perception: property attribution (predi-
cation). The relation between signifier and signified, being arbitrary, produces 
cross-linguistic variation depending on the way languages randomly match 
specific predicative relations with oral or gestural resources such as juxtaposition 
of elements, intonation, stress, length, or morphological markers.  
 Since both C-signs and unit signs are based on the same pre-existing 
properties of the sensorimotor and conceptual interfaces, Bouchard argues 
against the existence of a long proto-language stage, defending that all that is 
needed to have syntax is a brain equipped with OBS and subject to external self-
organizing constraints (ch. 7). Thus, the origin of C-signs is the result of predi-
cation being a ubiquitous aspect of perception, which ends up creating a pressure 
to match it with the gestural or oral percepts available to a language. Since 
storing words is costly in terms of memory, and perception is organized around 
an object–property dichotomy (Hurford 2007), it is not plausible that a language 
will develop a lexicon that treats each attribution of properties with a different 
root, so compositional processes come into play. Syntax, therefore, does not 
emerge for communication or the organization of thought (although it might as 
well produce such benefits), but as a regularizing side effect of the chaotic system 
that is triggered by OBS. 
 The final part of the book (Part IV) can be described as an open letter 
specifically addressed to linguists. These chapters analyze some formal, UG-
based models of linguistic phenomena under the cognitive umbrella of 
Bouchard’s STL, and so they are more technical and less interesting from a 
multidisciplinary perspective. I will only highlight that the author, faithful to the 
idea of looking for principled explanations, rejects many milestones of generative 
theory (Principles and Parameters, wh-movement, c-command), extending his 
notion of C-signs to specific cases that would require a very detailed elaboration, 
far beyond the scope of this review.  
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 So far, I have provided a summary for what I consider the main ideas 
discussed in the book. Although the picture of language that they present is 
coherent and promising, they will only triumph after some questions are some 
day answered, so I would like to finish this review by introducing a few of them. 
The first thing I would like to talk about is abstraction being the clear-cut line that 
separates humans from other animals. There is no doubt that humans excel at 
offline thought processes, but it is, in my view, too early to claim that these are a 
unique result of the evolutionary path followed by hominins. In fact, it is 
currently possible to find evidence suggesting that many species have to a certain 
extent some of the functions attributed to OBS. For instance, Osvath & Osvath 
(2008) show that great apes can select tools that will only be useful in the future 
in a not currently perceived location, indicating that immediate needs do not play 
a role in their behavior. Other experiments on animal episodic memory such as 
Clayton & Dickinson (1998) and Hoffman et al. (2009) show a capacity to integrate 
and remember information on what, where, and when in scrub jays and rhesus 
monkeys respectively.  
 This indicates that offline thought processes may not be human-specific, 
something that the STL would have to take into account to explain why language 
is. If the solution is that abstraction turns out to be language-enabling when it 
becomes frequent enough, then we would still need to consider why less-refined 
abstract thought processes cannot confer a less-refined linguistic stage, provided 
that abstraction was indeed all that is needed to acquire signs. In other words, if 
abstraction is gradual, we should ask ourselves either why within this gradation 
a critical point that facilitated the sudden acquisition of signs could have 
appeared, or if the acquisition of signs could have also been a gradual process. If 
the latter was the case, sign systems would not only have evolved by means of 
self-organizing constraints, but also in parallel with the evolution of OBS.  
 Whatever the answer turns out to be, my view is that the emergence of 
abstraction is simply not enough to explain the human-specific usage of signs, 
and that a means to reliably control abstractive processes, such as an 
improvement in executive control (Baddeley 1996, 2002), is also an important 
requirement, and perhaps the key to those who would like to claim that language 
is a relatively recent and sudden cognitive revolution.  The investigation on OBS 
could benefit from the copious amount of research that has been conducted so far 
on Working Memory, since both are reaching similar conclusions about the 
nature of humans’ cognitive uniqueness (e.g., Coolidge & Wynn 2005). 
 Additionally, a distinction should be made between the cognitive proper-
ties that are brought about by OBS, and those that are just an indirect result of 
them, being caused by the existence of signs. The most relevant example for the 
latter is cross-modularity, where representations produced by different modules 
can be joined together under the same word or sentence, generating what appear 
to be new conceptual capacities. In a series of experiments by Hermer & Spelke 
(1994, 1996) and Hermer-Vasquez et al. (1999), it was shown that masking the 
linguistic abilities of adult humans by making them repeat what they are listen-
ing to can impair their orientation skills to the level of rats and prelinguistic 
infants, since they are unable to use expressions such as to the right of X in their 
thoughts. Similarly, numerical words seem to be a combination of a system for 
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subitizing individuals and a system for representing large, inexact numerosities 
(Dehaene 1997).  
 Since these capacities do not seem to be part of our prelinguistic stock, it is 
not completely accurate to claim that language is a mere reflection of a shared 
conceptual interface plus abstraction, and that integration only pertains to the 
origin of OBS. On the contrary, it seems that the sign awakens new integrative 
processes, affecting thought in a unique way that still needs to be investigated as 
an enterprise on its own. To do so, we do not need to abandon the search for 
principled explanations. On the contrary, we should follow Bouchard’s sug-
gestion by looking for a possible relation between the sensorimotor aspects of 
signs and the enhancement of cognition. As a suggestion, we can claim that the 
arbitrary relation that exists between the signifier and signified allows that 
multiple signifieds can be associated with the same signifier, thus strengthening 
the connections between different, unrelated systems.  
 All in all, Bouchard’s Sign Theory of Language has the advantage of 
building a bridge from other disciplines to the usually isolationist realm of 
linguistics. Unlike other multidisciplinary attempts, this one makes a conscious 
effort to prevent as much as possible an almost inevitable simplification or 
vagueness, providing testable hypotheses and original perspectives for the 
solution of old problems. A quote on the back cover of the book by Christopher 
Petkov says: “Denis Bouchard’s theory may be exactly what is needed to take 
linguistics and neuroscience in exciting new directions.” Whether one of these 
directions will effectively take us to a full explanation of language evolution, we 
cannot yet foresee, but one thing we can depend on is that the advancement of 
science rarely sticks to the same road for long. 
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